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Marc Gurgand and Eric Maurin∗
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Abstract
We evaluate the wage impact of the strong and rapid increase in school-
ing levels experienced by the cohorts born after WWII in France. In or-
der to identify the causal eﬀect of education, we exploit the fact that the
small group of people graduating from elite education (Grandes Ecoles)
remained stable, while the rest of the system experienced tremendous
transformation. This provides a well defined control group. Using large
scale labor force surveys for the 1990’s, we find that the cohorts that re-
ceived more education have a lower wage gap, relative to Grandes Ecoles.
We show that such a large scale experiment measures a social return to
schooling even in the presence of signaling, whereas strategies based on
quasi-experiments are not necessarily robust to signaling. Our instrumen-
tal variable estimation finds returns to schooling very similar to the rest
of the literature, which is a strong case against the signaling hypothesis.
1 Introduction
As a result of renewed interest for education policies and evaluation methods,
significant progress has been made over the past decade in the measure of re-
turns to schooling. Convincing figures mostly confirm the picture based on
traditional Mincerian wage regressions: that returns to schooling are about 8%
in developped countries, maybe slightly higher (see Card, 2001, for a survey).
They result from empirical strategies based on quasi-experiments: exploiting a
source of exogenous variation in individual schooling levels allows to identify the
causal eﬀect of education on wages. Typical examples are Angrist and Krueger
(1991) that use quarter of birth as a random event or Oreopoulos (2006) using
a regression discontinuity design.
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Some of these approaches jointly provide returns to schooling estimates and
the evaluation of schooling policies: for instance Duflo (2001) for school building
in Indonesia, Meghir and Palme (2005) for secondary education reform in Swe-
den or Oreopoulos (2006) for compulsory schooling laws in the United Kingdom.
However, evaluation requires that these policies be local, either in the geograph-
ical or cohort dimension. Yet, many policies are general and long lasting, such
as the comprehensivation of the British system or the French democratization
considered here: it is no less important to measure their consequences in a
convincing manner.
Moving away from the canonical experimental paradigm has another feature:
it is less likely that returns to schooling can result from mere ability-ranking.
Indeed, since the 1970’s, the possibility that the value of schooling may lie in
its informational content rather than result from improved productivity (the
so-called signaling model), has been a serious theoretical challenge to the hu-
man capital literature. In a hypothetical controlled experiment, whereby a few
randomly chosen individuals would be granted more schooling, their wage in-
crease would actually be caused by education. However, in a pure signaling
model, they could simply free-ride over the signal conveyed by the mass of
educated individuals that are, in equilibrium, the most intrinsically productive
ones. Therefore, such a convincing identification strategy would measure private
returns but would fail to measure social returns - thus would have ambiguous
policy implications - if signaling played a role in the labor market.
Recent empirical evidence over the signaling model is limited and mixed
(Lang and Kropp, 1986, Kroch and Sjoblom, 1994, Bedard, 2001, Chevalier et
al., 2004, for instance). Therefore, the policy implication of estimated returns to
schooling remains an open question, and one that is rarely raised in the recent
literature. Large scale experiments allow to make progress in this direction, be-
cause a general wage increase resulting from wide educational expansion cannot
result from mere ability-ranking among the population. Naturally, this must
come at the cost of less random-like identification strategies.
In this paper, we evaluate the strong and rapid increase in schooling levels
that aﬀected the cohorts born in France between 1946 and 1970. During this
period, the share of males with no degree dropped from 43% to 25%, whereas
school duration increased by 2.5 years on average. This has been a complex
process, involving more schooling, to a large extent focussed at vocational ed-
ucation, but also a progressively less segmented secondary education system.
We evaluate the male wage impact of this experience as a whole. In particular,
we compute returns to schooling that, we argue, do not include private returns
from signaling, if any. The returns we find - 5 to 9% - are very similar to the
rest of the literature and, as often, slightly higher than standard OLS estimates.
As such, these findings are not supportive of the signaling model, and it is very
likely that private returns provide a legitimate guidance for policy purposes.1
Our evaluation of the French experience relies on the existence of a control
1 In a very diﬀerent setup, Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) cannot find positive externalities
deriving from average schooling in the population, which implies similarly that private returns
are no diﬀerent from social returns.
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group: the male population that receives elite education in the very traditional
Grandes écoles system. It hardly changes in size (4%) and composition over
this period: we thus assume that the unobserved characteristics of this group
remain constant, relative to the 96% remaining population. Using a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence approach, we can trace out the wage gap between the Grandes
écoles graduates and the rest of the population, accross cohorts observed in the
same labor market - that of the 1990’s. As the latter group becomes more and
more educated, the wage gap should decrease if schooling increases wages. More-
over, this cannot result from mere signaling, as it cannot result from relative
positions within the 96% "treated".
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Using a canonical signaling
model, Section 2 clarifies the conditions under which schooling returns based on
quasi-experiments can measure social returns if the signaling model is relevant,
and argues that the current approach is robust in this sense. Section 3 presents
educational expansion in France over the period considered and the specific
situation of Grandes écoles. The identification strategy based on diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence and instrumental variables is exposed in Section 4 and results are
presented in Section 5. Finaly, Section 6 explores the possibility that the results
could be driven by the evolution of the minimum wage. Section 7 concludes.
2 Human capital vs. signaling : interpreting
returns to schooling
From a policy perspective, the labor market signaling model introduced by
Spence (1973) challenges the literature on returns to education. This model
argues that wage-education contracts can be rationalized as a separating device
that reveals unobserved productivity to employers (see Riley, 2001, for a general
exposition). As a result, the wage-education relationship does not necessarily
imply that schooling raises productive capacity. Social and private returns to
educational investment then diﬀer. This section clarifies the conditions un-
der which returns to schooling estimated using quasi-experiements are likely to
measure social returns, if the signaling model is relevant. It illustrates that an
empirical strategy based on a full scale experiment, like this one, is very likely
to measure the full social returns to education in all cases.
Consider an economy with one schooling degree and initial productive capac-
ity u continuously distributed in the population, with cumulative F (u). Individ-
uals can undertake education at a cost c(u) that is decreasing in u and education
enhances productivity by β ≥ 0. Call w0(u) the wage received by an individual
with productivity u and no degree, and w1(u) her wage if she receives education.
The optimal choice is always to choose education if c(u) ≤ w1(u)−w0(u).
We consider two opposite models. In the human capital model, individuals
are paid their own marginal productivity, so that:
w0(u) = u
w1(u) = β + u
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We specify the signaling model in a way similar to Bedard (2001). If a
separating equilibrium exists2, it is such that:
c(u∗) = w1(u∗)−w0(u∗)
where u∗ is the marginal type that chooses to receive education, with:
w0(u∗) = E(u|u ≤ u∗) (1)
w1(u∗) = β +E(u|u ≥ u∗)
In essence of the signaling model, workers are paid the average productivity in
their group.3
The typical quasi-experimental strategy to estimate returns to education
does identify private returns to education, holding down unobserved ability,
but it may fail to estimate the same parameter in either model. Consider an
experiment or an instrumental variable that randomly lowers the schooling cost
for a share α of the population: individuals thus treated (T = 1) face a costec(u) < c(u). Call u∗ and eu∗ the marginal types in the untreated and treated
population respectively. The corresponding shares of unschooled individuals are
F (u∗) and F (eu∗). The Wald estimator used in the quasi-experimental approach
is based on the comparison of treated with untreated, namely:
E(w|T = 1)−E(w|T = 0)
[F (u∗)− F (eu∗)]
In the human capital model, the reduced form diﬀerence is:
E(w|T = 1)−E(w|T = 0) = [1− F (eu∗)]β +E(u)− [1− F (u∗)]β −E(u)
= [F (u∗)− F (eu∗)]β
so the Wald estimator measures β, which happens to be both the social and the
private return in this model.
In the signaling model, provided that the employers cannot identify the treated
from the untreated, which would be typically true in a small-scale experiment or
if information on wether a person is under treatment is not readily observable,
wages are now formed as a mixture of treated and untreated average produc-
tivity in each schooling level. Assuming a separating equilibrium exists, the
marginal types in each population are such that:
c(u∗) = ec(eu∗) = w1(u∗, eu∗)−w0(u∗, eu∗)
with equilibrium wages set at:
w0(u∗, eu∗) = F (eu∗)E(u|u ≤ eu∗) + (1− α) [F (u∗)− F (eu∗)]E(u|eu∗ ≤ u ≤ u∗)F (eu∗) + (1− α) [F (u∗)− F (eu∗)]
w1(u∗, eu∗) = [1− F (u∗)]E(u|u ≥ u∗) + α [F (u∗)− F (eu∗)]E(u|eu∗ ≤ u ≤ u∗)
[1− F (u∗)] + α [F (u∗)− F (eu∗)] + β
2We do not discuss here the conditions for existence and unicity. We simply consider the
possibility that there is signaling in the economy and the implications this would have for
estimation methods.
3Empirical wage heterogeneity within schooling levels is not modelled here and could result
from job heterogeneity for instance.
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Comparing wages of treated and untreated now gives:
E(w|T = 1)−E(w|T = 0) = F (eu∗)w0(u∗, eu∗) + [1− F (eu∗)]w1(u∗, eu∗)
−F (u∗)w0(u∗, eu∗)− [1− F (u∗)]w1(u∗, eu∗)
= [F (u∗)− F (eu∗)] [w1(u∗, eu∗)− w0(u∗, eu∗)]
and the Wald estimator thus measures:
E(w|T = 1)−E(w|T = 0)
[F (u∗)− F (eu∗)] = w1(u∗, eu∗)−w0(u∗, eu∗) > β
The signaling eﬀect of education is captured altogether with direct productivity
eﬀect. In particular, a positive private return can be found, even when β = 0.
Notice also that, in this model, the quasi-experimental approach would be
strictly equivalent to ordinary least squares. This could provide another possible
interpretation to the fact that instrumental variable estimates are only slightly
higher than ordinary least squares in most empirical applications (Card, 2001):
the small rise could simply be due to measurement error correction in the ab-
sence of a more foundamental diﬀerence. Our results, however, will rule this
out as a serious line of interpretation.
The center piece is that a quasi-experimental or instrumental variable strat-
egy is robust to the signaling hypothesis only if we can assume that employers
can sort out treated and untreated. The ideal controlled experiment that would
draw randomly a small sample of persons would identify private returns per-
fectly, but would fail to demonstrate the existence of a social return. In contrast,
an empirical approach based on a full scale policy that aﬀects entire generations
is more robust to the possibility that there is signaling. In such an experiment,
treated and untreated can be sorted out by employers, as they well known that
schooling distribution has evolved and that degrees held by younger people may
mean less. An interesting implication is that robustness to signaling may come
at the cost of a weaker identification strategy.
The experiment considered in this paper can be viewed as a decrease in
schooling cost from c(u) to ec(u) < c(u) over two generations, which leads to
a general schooling level increase in the second generation. The central point
is that generations are suﬃciently far appart that employers are very aware of
their potential diﬀerences, in particular regarding their unobserved ability. The
second generation being the treated one (T = 1), it is trivial that the Wald
estimator measures β in the human capital model. In the signaling model, the
first generation receives w0(u∗) and w1(u∗) as defined in equation 1 whereas the
second generation receives w0(eu∗) and w1(eu∗). However, the Wald estimator
still measures β:
E(w|T = 1)−E(w|T = 0) = F (eu∗)w0(eu∗) + [1− F (eu∗)]w1(eu∗)
−F (u∗)w0(u∗)− [1− F (u∗)]w1(u∗)
= [F (u∗)− F (eu∗)]β
The intuition is very obvious: as long as the mean E(u) is the same in the two
populations, an increase in average wage can only result from the real impact
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of schooling, β. Obviously, large scale experiences bring more information on
social returns than do small scale experiments. As a corolary, the signaling
model can be ruled out if returns are insensitive to the size of the experiment
used for identification.
With generations far appart, however, we cannot exclude systematic diﬀer-
ences in mean productive capacity accross cohorts. This would be confounded
with the eﬀect of schooling, β. In our empirical setup, therefore, we introduce
"Grandes Ecoles" (thereafter GE) to control for these potential changes. In the
context of this illustrative model, GE would come as a third level, rationed by
a numerus clausus, so that the specific cutoﬀ type u for GE does not change
accross generations. The data examined in the next section show that this
is a reasonable assumption. As a result, we can interpret changes in average
GE wages between generations as a measure of cohort-specific changes rather
than changing selectiviy into that level. This provides a control for systematic
diﬀerences in unobserved ability accross cohorts.
3 Educational expansion in France
The cohorts born after World War II in France have experienced a strong and
rapid increase in schooling levels, only comparable to the generalization of pri-
mary education that occurred in the late 19th century (Marchand and Thélot,
1997). Two phases can be distinguished. The first one concentrated eﬀorts on
vocational education, especially at secondary education level: it implied cohorts
born from 1946 until the mid sixties. The second phase witnessed a fast in-
crease in high school graduation for cohorts born from the mid-sixties to the
mid-seventies.
In order to document this evolution, we use data from the French labor
force surveys (enquêtes Emploi) from 1990 to 2002. This data is a yearly rep-
resentative sample of 1/300 of the metropolitan population, in which schooling
information is very detailed. We restrict our sample to individuals aged 26 to
56 (and out of school) at survey date. Because the survey has a three years
rotating panel structure, we use only one out of three years in order to compute
the cohort schooling levels, so as to exploit information on a single individual
only once. When we get to estimating wages, we will use the same data, but
with all available years and make proper adjustment to estimator variances for
individual correlation over time.
3.1 Two periods of a fast increase in secondary education
As illustrated by table 1, the main target during the first phase was lower sec-
ondary school, with specific emphasis on its vocational components4: about 30%
of men born in 1946 had one such degree and this figure rose to 38% twenty years
later. For women, the figures are 21% and 30% respectively. Meanwhile, the
share who ended up with no degree at all from initial education decreased from
4Grades: "Certificat d’aptitudes professionnelles" and "Brevets d’études professionnelles".
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43% (for men) and 53% (for women), to 30% (for men) and 28% (for women).
This trend is due to reforms that have made access to lower secondary educa-
tion easier and more democratic. During that period, the eﬀort on vocational
schooling also took place at a higher education level (grades "Brevet de techni-
cien supérieur" and "Diplôme universitaire technologique", both lasting for two
years after High School): the share of a cohort with such degrees increased from
5% to 9% for men and 6% to 12% for women. This resulted from the increased
supply (in volume and diversity) that took place in the late 1960’s.
The second phase was shorter but faster: over ten years (individuals born
from the mid-sixties to the mid-seventies), the share ending up with no degree
decreased by an additional 8 percentage points, and the share at lower voca-
tional education also decreased, whereas access to higher vocational education
continued to rise, by about 5 percentage points for both men and women. More
importantly, the share of the population getting a High School degree ("Bac-
calauréat") increased at an unprecedented pace: it doubled from 11 to 22% for
men and rose from 15 to 24% for women. To a large extent, this increase was
due to technical High School curricula, so that, overall, long term vocational
training has been substituted for short term one over this period. It should be
noted that the share of a cohort getting a Baccalauréat degree (or higher) is
stable since the mid 1990’s (that is for cohorts born after 1975 approximately).
To sum up, during the first period (twenty cohorts), average declared school-
ing duration increased by 1.4 years for men and 1.9 years for women (from 11.3
and 11.1 years, respectively). The second phase was even more impressive: over
only ten cohorts, average schooling increased again by 1.6 years for both men
and women.
3.2 Grandes écoles and higher education
While such strong changes were taking place, little or very little was happening
at higher education levels. In table 1, we have broken down non-vocational
higher education into three levels: the first level is a University two-years degree,
corresponding to the American Colleges; the second level is University Graduate
level, up to PhD. The third level is specific to the French two-tier system.
Since the early 19th century, a higher education track, distinct from University,
developped in parallel, under the labelGrandes écoles. They form an elite sector,
with rationed entry, ruled by selective examinations. The students from High
School considered the most academically performant are accepted into two-years
"Classes préparatoires", where they are trained for this examination. Depending
on their ranking, they are then received into the clearly stratified GEs, where
training lasts two to three years. Those who fail the selective examination join
University at the Graduate level. GEs are traditionnally public and train mostly
engineers, but private management schools are also present.
From table 1 and figures 1 and 2, it is apparent that the share of a cohort
getting any of these three levels as a highest degree hardly changed during the
first phase defined above, and this is in sharp contrast with what happened in
the rest of the schooling system.
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This observation will be the basis for our empirical strategy. As access to
GE is a rationed process that has not expanded, it is reasonable to assume
that, year after year, it was attended by the "same" population: the 5% most
successful students. This provides us with a control group, whose unobserved
characteristics (specifically "ability") has not changed relative to the rest of the
population. In another context, a related identification strategy has been used
by Acemoglu and Pischke (2001), who assume rank in the income distribution
to be a proxy for the household unobservable characteristics that aﬀect demand
for schooling, and could be counfounded with income level.
In a nutshell, if educational expansion aﬀecting the bunch of the population
has a causal eﬀect on wages, then the cohort-based wage gap with those who
access GEs must have decreased. Such a decrease cannot result from unobserved
characteristics.
Strictly speaking, however, the share of GE appears to be constant for men
belonging to cohorts 1946-1964 (see tests in table 2), that is during the first phase
of educational expansion. The male cohorts 1964-1973, as well as females over
the whole period, experienced a slow but statistically significant increase. When
we isolate the Top ranked GEs (that represent about 20% of GE students5), the
share is also constant for the cohorts 1946-1964, and even so for a larger span,
1946-1970. In contrast, if we enlarge the GE group to include Gratudate studies,
the share moves significantly with cohorts, even for males, first decreasing, then
increasing.
In the following, we will thus consider two definitions of the "control group",
GE or Top ranked GE, the latter for both cohorts sets 1946-1964 and 1946-
1970. Also, in order to avoid issues related to labor supply and selectivity, we
will restrict our wage analysis to males.6 As illustrated in tables 1 and 2, the
wage earners sub-sample shares the features of the whole population.
In order to justify further the hypothesis that the GE group maintained a
stable composition relative to the population, we test that its social origins did
not change. The labor force surveys have information on the father’s profes-
sion. Using five social classes, in order to have suﬃcient data, table 3 regresses
the probability to be a GE or Top-GE graduate, conditional on social origin,
a cohort trend and a cohort trend interacted with social origin. The social
stratification is very clear, but, for GEs, it does not change significantly over
time (the same holds for the wage earners sub-sample). Albouy and Wanecq
(2003) have made a comparable statement using the same data. The hypothesis
seems less robust for Top-GEs: sons of modest origin tend to catch up with sons
of managers, whereas the intermediate class tends to loose ground. However,
these movements are very small. Furthermore, Euriat and Thelot (1995) have
analyzed exhaustive data on the four most prestigious Top-GEs: Ecole poly-
technique, Ecole normale supérieure, Ecole nationale d’administration (ENA)
and Hautes études commerciales (HEC). They find that, for our period of in-
terest, the students’ social origins, relative to the social structure of the whole
5The list of Top GEs is imposed to us by enquête Emploi.
6 If anything, the fact that women access to GE has increased over cohorts would imply
that male became even more selected. We are thus on the safe side.
8
population, has remained remarkably stable.
4 Empirical model and identification strategy
4.1 The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model
Consider the following wage equation:
logw = θc + γa + βd + u
where c is an index for birth cohort, a for age, d for schooling degree (starting
d = 1 for no degree, up to d = n for the highest) and u unobserved productive
capacity. As date eﬀects cannot be separated from age and cohort eﬀects, they
are embedded in parameters θc and γa, that have thus no direct interpretation.
This model is additive in age, following the recent literature (e.g. Duflo, 2001,
Meghir and Palme, 2005, Oreopoulos, 2006, etc.) that relies on cohort analysis
to estimate returns to schooling.
Wage expectancy conditional on schooling, cohort and age is:
E(logw|d, c, a) = θc + γa + βd +E(u|d, c)
Expectancy E(u|d, c) varies with schooling d both because schooling decisions
are endogenous and because the schooling system is selective: this is the so-called
"ability bias". This expectancy also varies with cohorts c because, as access to
some degrees is enlarged or restricted, the average ability of the population with
any level d may change. For that reason, variations in schooling levels accross
cohorts cannot be used directly as a source of identification for parameters βd.
Yet, the identification strategy pursued in this paper relies on the observa-
tion that the share and social structure of the population receiving the elite
degree d = n ("Grandes écoles") remained stable over several cohorts, whereas
huge changes were taking place in the rest of the schooling system. Therefore,
we assume that selectivity between that level and the rest of the population
remained constant accross cohorts, in the sense that:
E(u|d < n, c)−E(u|d = n, c) = E(u|d < n)−E(u|d = n), ∀c (2)
This provides a control group for diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence identification. For
the upper level:
E(logw|d = n, c, a) = θc + γa + βn +E(u|d = n, c)
Also, for the group that did not get d = n:
E(logw|d < n, c, a) = θc + γa +
X
j<n
βjP (d = j|d < n, c) +E(u|d < n, c)
9
Comparing average GE wages with that of the rest of the population defines
∆(c). Under (2):
∆(c) = E(logw|d < n, c, a)−E(logw|d = n, c, a)
=
X
j<n
βjP (s = j|d < n, c)− βn +E(u|d < n)−E(u|d = n)
A diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator thus identifies:
∆(c0)−∆(c) =
X
j<n
βj [P (d = j|d < n, c0)− P (d = j|d < n, c)]
Because the share getting a given degree rises with cohorts at all levels
(except ”no degree”), the diﬀerence ∆(c0)−∆(c) must be positive for c0 > c, if it
is the case that rising education increases wages (namely: β1 < β2 < . . . < βn).
As such, the wage gap between GE graduates and the rest of the population
taken as a whole must decrease, as the general schooling level rises (even though
the level of selectivity may change over time for any degree d < n). Note that
this does not exclude the possibility that E(u|d = j, c) decreases along cohorts
for every j < n, as a result of expanded access of each level to students with
lower academic performance.
Notice that P (d = j|d < n, c) is observable, so that in principle, all βj ’s
could be identified separately. Unfortunately, over the period considered, those
probabilities move in parallel, so that the contribution of each schooling level is
not distinguishable empirically. The parameter that we can actually estimate
instead provides a general assessement of twenty years of educational expansion,
which is not disaggregated, but is very robust under hypothesis (2).
The model is estimated based on the following specification:
logw = θc + γa + α1(d < n) + bc1(d < n) + ε (3)
with 1(d < n) a dummy for non-GE graduate. Normalizing b1946 = 0, for
instance, bc would estimate
P
j<n βj [P (d = j|d < n, c)− P (d = j|d < n, 1946)]
that must be positive if there is a return to education. Parameter α estimates
E(u|d < n)− E(u|d = n)− βn, that is the baseline wage gap between GE and
the rest of the population, including the eﬀect of unobserved characteristics,
which cannot be distinguished from the causal eﬀect βn.
4.2 Instrumental variable estimation
The core hypothesis in this paper is that a change in the diﬀerential wage
between GE graduates and the rest of the population accross cohorts can only
be explained by educational expansion. In order to quantify this eﬀect in terms
of return and compare orders of magnitude with the literature, we can correlate
the drift in bc with the increase in average schooling years (below level n) by
cohort. More formally, we can switch this approach to an instrumental variable
strategy. Consider the equation:
logw = θc + γa + α1(d < n) + rS + ε (4)
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where S is an individually defined variable that measures schooling time.7 The
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model assumes that the interaction between cohort dum-
mies and no-GE dummy, explains education but has no direct eﬀect on wages,
once no-GE dummy and cohort dummy are included additively in the model.
As a result, the set of interactions provides a vector of instrumental variables
for S.
This approach does not imply that we have to assume a constant mar-
ginal return to schooling time, r, accross education levels or accross individ-
uals. Rather, the IV estimate can be interpreted as a weighted average of
possibly heterogenous returns, what Angrist and Imbens (1995) call an aver-
age causal response (ACR). To be explicit, take cohort 1946 as a reference,
consider cohort c and the instrument Zc = 1(d < n) × 1(cohort= c). Specify
logw = θc + γa + α1(d < n) + RS + u, where RS is a counterfactual individ-
ual specific shift associated with S years of education. For IV to estimate the
ACR, two assumptions are needed. First, the monotonicity assumption that
moving from cohort 1946 to cohort c would never imply reduced schooling for
anybody. Second, the independance assumption that the instrument is orthog-
onal not only to counterfactual wages at any level S, but also to the sequence
of schooling responses to the instrument itself. Under these conditions, the IV
parameter r (based on the two cohorts only in this example) estimates:X
k
ωkE [Rk −Rk−1|S1 ≥ k > S0]
where S0 is counterfactual schooling for Zc = 0 and S1 is counterfactual school-
ing for Zc = 1 and:
ωk =
P (S1 ≥ k > S0)P
j P (S1 ≥ j > S0)
is a weighting factor. Rk−Rk−1 captures the local return at schooling duration
k. The condition S1 ≥ k > S0 implies that only individuals who would increase
their education under the eﬀect of the instrument contribute to the estimation.
Moreover, the education levels at which changes are more likely make a stronger
contribution. The monotonicity assumption, that allows such an interpretation,
is reasonable in this context: it implies that the increase should take place at
all education levels (except GE) along cohorts, which we actually observe. The
independance assumption basically requires here that, if cohort 1946 had been
exposed to the cohort c schooling system, it would have had the same schooling
levels on average.
When more cohorts are included, the estimator measures a weighted sum of
these eﬀects, where cohorts that contribute a more eﬃcient estimation receive
more weight (see Angrist and Imbens, 1995, theorem 2).
7Notice that, as we condition on age rather than on potential experience, the return that
we estimate takes into account the fact that an additional schooling year reduces potential
experience by one year. In that sense we compute net returns. They should be lower than
the returns based on traditional Mincer equations, but are more policy relevant and are
comparable to much of the returns estimated in the recent literature.
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5 Estimation results
5.1 Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation
Equation (3) is estimated based on data on males aged 26 to 56, from the 1990
to 2002 labor force surveys enquête Emploi, using the hourly log-wage rate as an
explained variable. As individuals are surveyed three years in a row - following a
rotating panel structure - we allow for panel individual autocorrelation. Figure
3 presents the series of estimates of the cohort wage gap between GE and non-
GE, (α+ bc) defined in equation (3), for several definitions of the control group
over the samples 1946-1964 and 1946-1970. It shows very clearly that the wage
gap between GE graduates and the rest of the population is decreasing along
cohorts, for both control groups and samples. Assuming that the diﬀerences in
unobserved ability accross the two groups did not change, we can interpret this
as the result of the strong increase in the schooling level of the "treated" group.
Figure 3 also shows that the evolution of cohort eﬀects is reasonably approx-
imated by a linear trend. The corresponding specification is presented in table
4 for the two samples and GE or Top-GE when applicable. Specification (1) im-
plies that the wage gap between GE students and the rest of the population has
decreased by about 0.35% per generation, or about 6.3% in all 18 generations.8
During this first shooling expansion period, the share of the male population
with some degree increased by 14% (table 1). Therefore, the average degree was
worth a 45% wage increase (0.063/0.14).
The eﬀect is somewhat higher when we consider Top-GEs and when we ex-
tend the cohort range. The wage gap reduction rises up to 1% per generation.
This trend in wage gap reduction is all the more striking, as school duration
increased slightly for GE graduates over the period (see table 1). An obvious
reason for these higher figures is the accelerated increase of schooling level that
took place during the second period of educational expansion. In addition, as
we extend the cohort range, the very nature of schooling progress changes. In-
deed, during the second period, about 22% of the population has shifted from
no degree or lower vocational degree to High school graduation or tertiary voca-
tional degree (table 1). These maybe more rewarding degrees, or the population
concerned by these very changes may have higher latent returns to schooling
than the population aﬀected by the increase at lower secondary education, that
characterized the first period. Generally, one must bear in mind that this is an
overall evaluation of a set of actions that resulted in increased levels but included
many qualitative changes and a complex intrication of schooling policies.
5.2 Instrumental variable estimation
Relating the above cohort trends with the corresponding increase in schooling
duration provides a measure of the returns to schooling that would make this
8This figure is not directly apparent in the table because the cohort variable has been
normalized.
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results comparable to the literature. Equivalently, instrumental variable estima-
tion of the standart returns to schooling model are presented in Table 5, using
the declared age at completed initial education to measure schooling time. Or-
dinary least squares are also reported. The OLS returns are around 6%, which
is very much in line with what is usually found in developped countries.
The IV estimates use either GE dummy interacted with cohort dummies or
Top-GE dummy interacted accordingly. For the base sample, 1946-1964, they
are slightly lower, between 5 and 6%, depending on the set of instruments.
This should not result from weak instruments that would bias the IV estimator
towards OLS, because the excluded instruments explain schooling duration very
well. The estimation based on the extended cohorts generates a somewhat higher
return (9.8%), but it is not significantly diﬀerent from the OLS at the 5% level.
As discussed in the above section, the nature of the educational expansion for
the additional cohorts 1965-1970 is specific: the reduced form has shown that,
when these cohorts are included, the cohort eﬀect is somewhat steeper. Using
diﬀerent identification strategies, Maurin and McNally (2005) and Maurin and
Xenogiani (2007), find very comparable results for France.9
In theory, there is a possibility that selectivity could drive those results:
the younger low education cohorts could be more often unemployed, so that
the productivity of the working sample could be higher than for older cohorts,
if the unemployed are on average less productive. Yet, the 26-56 age range
is not the most sensitive to unemployment. Moreover, selectivity correction
can be implemented using the GE×cohort interactions as instruments for both
schooling and selection probability, because there are as many as there are
cohorts. When we introduce the selection probability as a control function in
various ways (as an inverse Mills ratio or as a quartic function), returns to
schooling remain very robust.
Overall, these results are very much in line with the previous litterature
that uses IV based on quasi-experiments to estimate the returns to schooling.
In most of the available estimates, OLS returns are most often around 6 or 7%
and incrase slightly - but not always - when IV is implemented (cf. Card, 2001,
table II). In most cases, the diﬀerence between OLS and IV are not significant.
As argued, our estimation based on a large scale experiment should be more
robust to the possibility that the underlying model involves signaling, so that
this 5 to 9% coeﬃcient can be considered a measure of the social return to
schooling. There is no evidence that this return is very diﬀerent from either
OLS in France or estimates elsewhere based on strategies that would measure
the private rather than the social return if they were distinct. In this context,
there is little evidence in favor of the signaling hypothesis.
9More precisely, those two papers report returns to the order of 13-14%. But this paper
measures years of education as actual duration spent studying, including grade repetition,
whereas the above mentioned papers use years implied by attained levels. Using the latter
measure here would generate returns around 10-13%. The diﬀerence between our baseline 6-9%
and this 10-13% indicates how much is spared by frequent repetition in the French system.
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6 The minimum wage impact on wage equaliza-
tion
In assumption (2), E(u|d < n, c) and E(u|d = n, c) are understood to describe
the evolution of the unobserved characteristics of individuals, that may aﬀect
simultaneously school performance and the wage rate. We have argued that it is
a reasonable hypothesis, in the French context, to consider that E(u|d < n, c)−
E(u|d = n, c) is constant accross cohorts 1946-1964 or 1946-1970 (depending
on the definition of n). As a result, we attribute changes in the wage gap, as
depicted in figure 3, to the increased schooling level of the treated group. But
we may consider that labor market or other events also contained in the residual
u, could equalize wages along the cohort dimension. In this section, we explore
the possibility that the minimum wage could have such an equalizing eﬀect, if
workers at lower schooling levels have benefitted from minimum wage increases.
Figure 4 shows the strong movements in the (net) minimum wage that occurred
since WWII, whether expressed in real terms or relative to the average wage.
First, notice that the current level of the minimum wage is not a source of
concern. As cohorts get more educated on average, they should be less aﬀected
by the minimum wage truncature, conditional on age: by itself, this would
predict an increase in the wage gap, rather than the observed decrease. However,
conditional on age, diﬀerent cohorts are not observed at the same date, therefore
at the same level of the minimum wage. Yet, as illustrated in figure 4, the
minimum wage was fairly stable during the 1990’s, our period of observation.
All in all, current minimum wage is not an obvious alternative explanation to
our findings.
The impact of past minimum wage could be more relevant, to the extent
that entry wages have lasting eﬀects. Baker et al. (1994) argue that this is the
case in the United States. In the same line, Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) find a
link between past unemployment and current wage, although von Wachter and
Bender (2006) argue the evidence is not so strong. Still, there is no available
evidence for the minimum wage impact specifically. If there is persistency, then
a wage increase (relative to GE) accross cohorts could be explained by a trend
in the minimum wage at the time of entry in the labor market. For cohorts
1946-1964, the relevant minimum wages are those prevailing between 1959 and
1990. Over this period, the minimum wage was first stable (or decreased relative
to the average wage), then increased strongly, then was stable again (figure 4).
To test whether the minimum wage is an omitted variable in the previous
estimations, we include it, evaluated at time of entry on the labor market. Our
initial equation is thus extended to:
logw = θc + γa + α1(d < n) + rS + λwc+6+S + ε0
where wt is the minimum wage at date t and c+6+S measures age at entry on
the labor market. It is important to note that, because schooling is endogenous,
so is wc+6+S. A higher minimum wage due to longer schooling and thus later
entry, may be confounded with unobserved ability. We can instrument this
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variable using the same instruments as previously, because there are as many
instruments as there are cohorts. Identification is made possible because the
schooling variable is increasing steadily with cohorts, whereas the minimum
wage is stable for early and late cohorts.
Results are presented in table 6, with the real minimum wage included in
levels. Based on ordinary least squares, entry minimum wage seems to have
some eﬀect on future wages, but this has no impact on the estimated returns
to schooling in any specification. Once schooling and minimum wage are in-
strumented, there is no longer any evidence that the latter has some impact,
whereas the IV returns to schooling remain similar to previous results, or even
slightly higher but also less precisely estimated.
Another approach is to leave out the workers with low education, say less
than S = 10, thus those most aﬀected by the minimum wage.10 If minimum
wage changes were driving the results, the returns to schooling should drop. If
we do this, however, the "treated" population is no longer stable accross cohorts:
as general education levels increase, individuals with a given low schooling level
represent a smaller and smaller share of the population. Should they be in
the lower tail of productive capacity, the remaining group (S ≥ 10) would
have decreasing average unobserved productivity. Therefore, if anything, we
would underestimate the returns to schooling. The corresonding IV estimates
are presented in table 7. Coeﬃcients are similar to baseline IV, with only an
increase for cohorts 1946-1964 with GE as a control group, but not a significant
one, given confidence intervals. Overall, we can find no convincing evidence that
the minimum wage does explain the constant trend in wage gap reduction.
7 Conclusion
This paper uses a diﬀerence in diﬀerence strategy to evaluate a large scale policy:
the significant and fast increase in schooling levels that benefited the cohorts
born after World War II in France. It exploits the fact that the group that had
access to the elite segment of the educational system, the Grandes écoles, has
remained stable in size and social composition. As a result, the evolution of the
wage gap between GE graduates and the rest of the population, cohort after
cohort, should reflect the fact that the schooling level of the "treated" group has
increased steadily relative to the "control", and should not result from changes
in their relative unobserved characteristics. Using labor market data for the
1990’s, thus observing every one in the same economic environment, we find
indeed that the wage gap has become regularly and significantly smaller cohort
after cohort. Quantifying this eﬀect implies wage returns to schooling between
5 and 9%, in the usual range for developped countries.
Naturaly, there can be other events that, for some cohorts and not others,
aﬀected GE graduates diﬀerentialy from the rest of the population. In par-
ticular, we explore the possibility that increased minimum wage over much of
10The S = 10 threeshold is used because a large share of increased schooling under the
period resulted from a shift from S = 8 to S = 10 to 12.
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the period when these cohorts entered the labor market, could explain the gap
reduction. Our results are robust to this possibility.
Although our identification strategy is not based on a quasi-random feature,
it oﬀers an evaluation of a large and long lasting experiment taken as a whole.
Moreover, the interpretation of returns to schooling is straightforward in such a
setup: steady wage increases of entire cohorts is not compatible with the view
that there are private but no social returns to schooling. As our estimated
returns are similar both to ordinary least squares and to returns estimated
elsewhere, it is likely that there is little gap between private and social returns
in general. This is a strong case against the signaling hypothesis.
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No degree Lower voc. H.S. grad. Higher voc. College (2 years) Univ. grad. Grandes écoles School duration School duration among GE
1946 42.9% 29.9% 9.8% 4.6% 1.4% 7.1% 4.3% 11.3 17.5
1950 38.8% 33.3% 9.4% 5.4% 1.8% 7.4% 3.9% 11.6 17.6
1954 36.2% 35.3% 11.0% 5.6% 1.7% 6.6% 3.6% 11.9 17.6
1958 35.8% 34.9% 10.3% 6.2% 1.5% 7.1% 4.0% 12.2 17.5
1962 31.6% 38.4% 11.1% 7.2% 1.7% 6.1% 4.0% 12.5 17.7
1966 29.7% 37.4% 10.8% 9.7% 1.8% 6.2% 4.5% 12.9 18.0
1970 25.3% 31.8% 15.1% 12.8% 1.8% 8.1% 5.2% 13.7 19.0
1974 21.2% 24.2% 22.6% 14.8% 1.6% 10.9% 4.7% 14.4 18.0
No degree Lower voc. H.S. grad. Higher voc. College (2 years) Univ. grad. Grandes écoles School duration School duration among GE
1946 53.4% 21.2% 9.8% 5.6% 2.3% 7.0% 0.7% 11.1 17.0
1950 48.2% 23.6% 10.4% 7.1% 3.2% 6.9% 0.6% 11.4 16.7
1954 45.2% 23.9% 11.6% 8.3% 2.6% 7.2% 1.2% 11.9 17.3
1958 40.7% 24.8% 14.1% 9.4% 2.8% 7.3% 0.9% 12.2 17.6
1962 35.1% 27.9% 15.4% 10.7% 2.5% 7.2% 1.2% 12.6 17.6
1966 28.2% 30.7% 14.8% 12.0% 2.6% 9.6% 2.1% 13.3 17.8
1970 23.2% 26.6% 18.3% 14.7% 2.6% 12.5% 2.1% 14.0 17.3
1974 20.2% 16.9% 23.6% 17.4% 2.5% 16.0% 3.4% 14.7 17.7
No degree Lower voc. H.S. grad. Higher voc. College (2 years) Univ. grad. Grandes écoles School duration School duration among GE
1946 42.1% 29.8% 10.2% 4.6% 1.7% 7.2% 4.4% 11.3 17.4
1950 38.7% 32.6% 10.0% 5.9% 2.1% 6.8% 3.9% 11.5 17.5
1954 35.4% 35.7% 11.2% 6.0% 2.1% 6.0% 3.5% 11.9 17.6
1958 35.5% 35.3% 10.0% 6.3% 1.8% 6.7% 4.3% 12.2 17.5
1962 30.4% 39.4% 11.1% 7.2% 1.7% 6.1% 4.2% 12.5 17.6
1966 26.9% 38.0% 11.2% 10.3% 2.0% 6.5% 5.0% 13.1 17.9
1970 23.0% 32.7% 15.2% 13.9% 2.0% 7.9% 5.3% 13.7 18.0
1974 18.3% 25.2% 22.8% 16.0% 1.4% 10.8% 5.5% 14.5 17.9
Source: Enquêtes Emploi,  1990/1993/1996/1999/2002; 26 to 56 years old.
Males earning a wage
Females
Males
Table 1: Male and female highest degrees and school duration by birth year
Sub-sample
F-test p-value F-test p-value F-test p-value
Born 1946-1964 4.63 0.0000 0.95 0.5140 1.48 0.0878
Born 1946-1964, earning a wage 3.42 0.0000 0.97 0.4867 1.20 0.2473
Born 1946-1970 4.23 0.0000 2.00 0.0026 1.27 0.1723
Born 1946-1970, earning a wage 3.71 0.0000 2.23 0.0005 1.02 0.4283
Source: Enquêtes Emploi, 1990/1993/1996/1999/2002; 26 to 56 years old men. Variances are adjusted for survey year-wise effects. Based on 119,720
observations for 1946-1964 (89,126 for wage earners) and 144,958 for 1946-1970 (108,967 for wage earners).
Table 2: Effect of birth year on the proportion of men graduating from elite education
Top GE
Test of equality of birth year dummies
GE + Graduate studies GE
coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e.
Father Manager/Professional (ref.) - - - - - -
Father Technician/Supervisor -0.1060 0.0049 -0.0258 0.0024 -0.0251 0.0020
Father Self-employed -0.1233 0.0048 -0.0299 0.0023 -0.0300 0.0019
Father Clerical -0.1395 0.0046 -0.0311 0.0023 -0.0316 0.0019
Father Farmer/Manual worker -0.1594 0.0043 -0.0357 0.0022 -0.0359 0.0018
Cohort trend -0.0029 0.0053 -0.0036 0.0028 -0.0033 0.0020
Cohort trend x Father Technician/Supervisor -0.0042 0.0061 -0.0015 0.0032 -0.0004 0.0022
Cohort trend x Father Self-employed -0.0010 0.0059 0.0028 0.0029 0.0028 0.0021
Cohort trend x Father Clerical -0.0017 0.0057 0.0030 0.0029 0.0024 0.0020
Cohort trend x Father Farmer/Man. Worker 0.0006 0.0054 0.0031 0.0028 0.0030 0.0020
Constant 0.1709 0.0043 0.0371 0.0022 0.0373 0.0018
F-test for interacted cohort trends: p-value 0.4409 0.0274 0.0055
Number of observations 115,366 115,366 139,783
Top Grandes écoles : Males born 1946-70
Source: Enquêtes Emploi, 1990/1993/1996/1999/2002; 26 to 56 years old men. Linear probability model. Standard errors are adjusted for survey year-wise effects. The cohort variable is standardized
(original mean :1957.78 and s.e.: 7.34).
Table 3: Probability to access elite education, conditional on social origin
Top Grandes écoles : Males born 1946-64Grandes écoles : Males born 1946-64
coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e.
Specification (1)
Non-GE graduate -0.7571 0.0069
Non-GE graduate x cohort trend 0.0259 0.0088  
Specification (2)
Non-Top GE graduate -0.8429 0.0155 -0.8247 0.0137
Non-Top GE graduate x cohort trend 0.0483 0.0183 0.0747 0.0146
Cohorte dummies yes yes
Age dummies yes yes
Number of observations 233,189 287,031
Source: Enquêtes Emploi, 1990 to 2002; 26 to 56 years old men. Explained variable is log-wage. Each couple of
coefficients is from a separate regression. Standard errors account for the panel autocorrelation structure. The cohort
variable is standardized (original mean :1957.78 and s.e.: 7.34).
Table 4: Difference-in-difference wage regression
Males born 1946-1970Males born 1946-1964
coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e.
Using GE interactions as instruments
Declared schooling duration 0.0574 0.0004 0.0497 0.0191
F-test for excluded instruments 15.45
Non-GE graduate dummy yes yes
Cohorte dummies yes yes
Age dummies yes yes
Using Top GE interactions as instruments
Declared schooling duration 0.0643 0.0004 0.0584 0.0244 0.0618 0.0004 0.0975 0.0200
F-test for excluded instruments 8.95 13.92
Non-Top GE graduate dummy yes yes yes yes
Cohorte dummies yes yes yes yes
Age dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 230,914 230,914 284,534 284,534
Source: Enquêtes Emploi, 1990 to 2002; 26 to 56 years old men. Explained variable is log-wage. Each coefficients is from a separate regression. Standard
errors account for the panel autocorrelation structure. Excluded instruments for schooling time are Non-GE or Non-Top-GE dummy interacted with cohort
dummies.
Table 5: OLS and IV returns to education
OLS IV
Males born 1946-1964
OLS IV
Males born 1946-1970
coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e.
Using GE interactions as instruments
Declared schooling duration 0.0542 0.0008 0.0858 0.0452
F-test for excluded instruments: 15.45
log minimum wage at entry 0.0773 0.0175 -0.1290 0.1355
F-test for excluded instruments: 1913.58
Non-GE graduate dummy yes yes
Cohorte dummies yes yes
Age dummies yes yes
Using Top GE interactions as instruments
Declared schooling duration 0.0624 0.0008 0.0608 0.0487 0.0564 0.0006 0.0993 0.0401
F-test for excluded instruments: 8.95 13.92
log minimum wage at entry 0.0486 0.0180 -0.0124 0.2327 0.1579 0.0146 -0.0102 0.2150
F-test for excluded instruments: 613.26 96.53
Non-Top GE graduate dummy yes yes yes yes
Cohorte dummies yes yes yes yes
Age dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 230,914 284,534
Source: Enquêtes Emploi, 1990 to 2002; 26 to 56 years old men. Explained variable is log-wage. Minimum wage is expressed in real terms. Standard errors account for the panel autocorrelation
structure. Excluded instruments for schooling time and minimum wage are Non-GE or Non-Top-GE dummy interacted with cohort dummies.
Table 6: Impact of minimum wage at labor market entry
IV IVOLS OLS
Males born 1946-1964 Males born 1946-1970
coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e.
Using GE interactions as instruments
Declared schooling duration 0.0916 0.0211
F-test for excluded instruments 13.14
Non-GE graduate dummy yes
Cohorte dummies yes
Age dummies yes
Using Top GE interactions as instruments
Declared schooling duration 0.0594 0.0396 0.0953 0.0341
F-test for excluded instruments 4.37 5.01
Non-Top GE graduate dummy yes yes
Cohorte dummies yes yes
Age dummies yes yes
Number of observations 184392 235070
Source: Enquêtes Emploi, 1990 to 2002; 26 to 56 years old men, with more than 10 years of schooling. Explained
variable is log-wage. Each coefficients is from a separate regression. Standard errors account for the panel
autocorrelation structure. Excluded instruments for schooling time are Non-GE or Non-Top-GE dummy interacted with
cohort dummies.
Males born 1946-1964 Males born 1946-1970
Table 7: IV returns to education, restricted to individuals with 10 years of schooling or more
IV IV
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Figure 3: Cohort specific relative wage - Males born 1946-1964
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